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Abstract
We study the impact of corporate governance frictions in an economy where growth is driven
both by the foundation of new rms and by the in-house investment of incumbent rms. Firms
managers engage in tunneling and empire building activities. Active shareholders monitor man-
agers, but can shirk on their monitoring, to the detriment of minority (passive) shareholders.
The analysis reveals that these conicts among rms stakeholders inhibit the entry of new
rms, thereby increasing market concentration. Despite depressing investment returns in the
short run, the frictions can however lead incumbents to invest more aggressively in the long run
to exploit the concentrated market structure. By means of quantitative analysis, we characterize
conditions under which corporate governance reforms boost or reduce welfare.
Keywords: Endogenous Growth, Market Structure, Financial Frictions, Corporate Gover-
nance.
JEL Codes: E44, O40, G30
1 Introduction
The quality of nancial markets, including their ability to govern conicts among rmsnanciers,
managers and other stakeholders, is increasingly viewed as a major determinant of the long-run
performance of industrialized and emerging economies. Several scholars argue that cross-country
di¤erences in growth and productivity can be attributed to a signicant extent to di¤erences in
corporate governance (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny, 2000). Recent empirical studies conrm the importance of corporate governance in the
growth process (see, e.g., De Nicolo, Laeven, Ueda, 2008). The OECD (2012) summarizes this
body of evidence by arguing that corporate governance exerts a strong inuence on resource
E-mail address: minetti@msu.edu . We wish to thank Guido Cozzi, Tullio Jappelli, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,
Marco Pagano, Alessandra Pelloni, John Seater, and seminar and conference participants at Birkbeck College, Duke
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Oxford University, UniversitaCattolica (Milan), University of Naples Federico II and Center for Studies in Economics
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allocation. It impacts upon innovative activity and entrepreneurship. Better corporate governance,
therefore, both within OECD and non-OECD countries should manifest itself in enhanced corporate
performance and can lead to higher economic growth.
Although there is a broad consensus that corporate governance can be relevant for growth,
there is little agreement about the channels through which its e¤ect operates. On the one hand,
the advocates of the rule of lawview maintain that economies in which nancial markets guar-
antee stronger protection of minority shareholders and managerial discipline enjoy more intense
competition and better growth performance. According to this view, the inability of some emerg-
ing economies to ameliorate corporate governance problems hinders their e¤orts to catch up with
advanced economies. On the other hand, the governments of several emerging countries and of some
advanced ones have often pursued nancial and corporate policies that have accommodated the in-
formational opacity of businesses in nancial markets as well as managersempire building attitudes
(OECD, 2010). The experience of business groups ubiquitous in middle-income countries  is
paradigmatic in this respect. Many governments have enacted policies that have protected business
group a¢ liates, allowing them to disclose limited information to nancial markets. A consequence
has been that managers of large group a¢ liates have often been able to engage in tunneling
activities, diverting resources especially at the expense of minority shareholders. In addition, in
the belief that large businesses would better compete in global markets, governments have often
favored the appointment of managers with empire building attitudes. The advocates of these poli-
cies stress that large business group a¢ liates have engaged in aggressive investment policies and
turned out to be the engines of the rapid growth of several countries, such as Korea, Indonesia,
Thailand, Brazil, Chile, and Japan. By contrast, their opponents maintain that these policies have
forestalled competition and inhibited entrepreneurship. The impact on economic growth and the
overall welfare consequences thus remain ambiguous a priori (see, e.g., Khanna, 2000, and Morck,
Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005, for a discussion).
This paper aims at shedding new light on this debate. Regardless of which view one endorses,
the above discussion implies that, to understand the e¤ects of corporate governance frictions on
the long-run performance of an economy, one needs to investigate how such frictions inuence both
entrepreneurship, that is, the ease with which new rms can enter product markets, and the speed
at which incumbent rms grow. On the extensive (rm entry) margin, scholars document the
profound e¤ects that corporate governance reforms have had on the market structure of various
countries in recent decades, inuencing the ease with which new rms break into markets (see,
e.g., Fulghieri and Suominen, 2013, and Hyytinen, Kuosa and Takalo, 2002). Indeed, although
unconditional correlations are merely suggestive, Figure 1 reveals a clear cross-country positive
correlation between measures of investors protection and the intensity of rm entry.1 On the
1The data refer to 99 industrialized and emerging countries. For both rm entry and investor protection, the data
are from the World Bank. Investor protection is a 1-10 index obtained as the average of three 1-10 indices for extent
of disclosure, extent of director liability, and ease of shareholder suits (World Banks Doing Business database, 2013
update). Firm entry is measured by the number of new limited liability corporations registered in 2012 per 1,000
people ages 15-64 (World Banks Entrepreneurship Survey and database).
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intensive (incumbentsinvestment) margin, there is established evidence that corporate governance
frictions can distort the investment decisions of incumbent rms (see, e.g., Aghion, Van Reenen and
Zingales, 2013; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005). Clearly, analyzing
how corporate governance shapes both the entry of new rms and the growth of incumbent ones
can also yield far-reaching insights for the current policy debate. The Great Recession has led to
calls for nancial and corporate reforms. Reforms that boost the investments of incumbent rms
may entail a cost in terms of more rigidity in the entry of new rms and, hence, in the market
structure (The Economist, 2012).
To explore these issues, we embed imperfect corporate governance in a model economy where
endogenous growth is driven both by the foundation of new rms that o¤er new intermediate
products (the extensive margin) and by the investment of incumbent rms in the quality of their
existing intermediate products (the intensive margin). The economy is populated by households,
who, besides working for rms, can act as rm shareholders and managers. Active shareholders
gather funds from other households (minority shareholders) to found new rms and introduce new
varieties of products. Managers are in charge of production and investment decisions concerning
existing products. The critical feature of our economy consists of the presence of conicts between
managers and shareholders and between active shareholders and minority shareholders. We model
such frictions taking a leaf from the nance literature, especially Nikolov and Whited (2013). We
let rm managers and active shareholders engage in moral hazard. In particular, as in Nikolov and
Whited (2013), managers can engage in tunneling activities (divert resources from rms) and empire
building (pursue private benets tied to rm size). Firm active shareholders can monitor managers
on behalf of all shareholders to mitigate managersmoral hazard. However, they can shirk on this
activity, putting little e¤ort in monitoring managers. The incentive of active shareholders to monitor
managers depends on their equity stake in rms: to induce monitoring, minority shareholders need
to surrender part of rmssurplus to active shareholders. Thus, rm active shareholders extract
rents from minority shareholders. This way of modelling corporate governance frictions not only
replicates prior studies but also matches the above-mentioned evidence on the corporate governance
problems of several countries in recent decades.
We examine how corporate governance frictions a¤ect incumbents investment as well as the
entry of new rms and, hence, the market structure. We also investigate how, in turn, the market
structure feeds back on the intensity of corporate governance frictions. The analysis reveals that
both tunneling and empire building activities alter the market structure by exerting an upward
pressure on the size of rms and slowing down the entry of new rms. This, in turn, implies that
both frictions depress the variety of intermediate products. Intuitively, the corporate governance
frictions act as an additional barrier to the entry of new rms, forcing minority shareholders not
only to sustain standard technological entry costs, but also to commit additional expected returns
to managers and active shareholders to mitigate conicts inside rms. The e¤ect of the frictions
on incumbentsinvestment can be more ambiguous. On the one hand, by inducing a consolidation
of the market structure, corporate governance frictions tend to boost the rate at which incumbent
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rms invest in existing products. Intuitively, exactly because of the market consolidation and
the larger rm size sustainable in equilibrium, incumbents can reap larger benets from investing
in their products. On the other hand, especially in the case of empire building, the corporate
governance frictions distort production decisions, depressing the return on investment in existing
products. We obtain that in the long run the market size e¤ect tends to prevail and the frictions
can induce more aggressive investment by incumbents.
Interestingly, the market structure can in turn feed back on the intensity of corporate gov-
ernance frictions. A popular idea in the literature is that managersmoral hazard can be more
severe in larger rms, for example because active shareholdersmonitoring becomes more complex
in larger businesses (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). An increase in rms size associated with a
market consolidation can then produce an overall reduction in the e¢ ciency of active shareholders
monitoring, exacerbating managersincentives to engage in moral hazard. In our economy, rm size
is in turn endogenously inuenced by the corporate governance frictions, so a mutually reinforcing
interaction (multipliere¤ect) between quality of corporate governance and market structure can
arise in the growth process.
The e¤ects illustrated above yield that the net welfare impact of corporate governance frictions
is ambiguous a priori. On the one hand, the frictions tend to depress welfare by inhibiting the
entry of new rms and reducing the array of intermediate products. On the other hand, when
their positive e¤ects on investment prevail over the negative ones, the frictions tend to increase
welfare through this channel. When we calibrate corporate governance parameters in line with
the empirical ndings of Nikolov and Whited (2013) for the United States, we observe that the
welfare change due to the investment e¤ect outweighs the entry rate welfare e¤ect. Conversely,
when we consider an economy with corporate governance frictions of an intensity comparable to
that found in emerging countries, the welfare cost due to the alteration of the market structure is
the prevailing force. This has important policy implications: ameliorating corporate governance
promotes welfare more in countries with poor initial governance (e.g., emerging countries) than
in countries with good initial governance (e.g., advanced economies). Thus, the arguments often
put forward in emerging countries to justify rmsinformational opacity in nancial markets and
managersempire building behavior appear to be misplaced.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates the analysis to prior litera-
ture. Sections 3 and 4 present the real sector of the model economy, introduce corporate governance
frictions, and solve for agentsdecisions. Section 5 characterizes the general equilibrium structure
and solves for the steady state. In Sections 6-8, we investigate the dynamics of the economy and
the response of the economy to shocks to corporate governance frictions, for example reecting
corporate governance reforms. Section 9 studies how corporate governance frictions inuence the
long-run pattern of development of the economy. Section 10 concludes. The proofs of the model
are relegated to the Technical Appendix.
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2 Prior Literature
There is a growing literature on the role of nancial markets in the growth process. Yet, little
is known about the role of corporate governance frictions, especially when we take the market
structure of the economy into account. Despite early attempts and calls for more research (see,
e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1998), theoretical work on how corporate governance a¤ects growth has
lagged behind the policy-oriented debate. A notable exception is recent work by Akcigit, Alp and
Peters (2014). Akcigit et al. consider an e¤ort model in which the entry rate of new rms is given.
By holding up rms ex post, managers can discourage the increase in the scope of rmsproduct
lines. Thus, in their model corporate governance frictions hamper the expansion of the range of
activities of incumbent rms. Other papers that study the long-run e¤ect of corporate governance
include Caselli and Gennaioli (2013) and Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2014). Caselli and
Gennaioli (2013) model an economy in which credit market frictions can induce the transmission
of rm ownership to ine¢ cient heirs, inhibiting the reallocation of ownership to more productive
agents. In turn, such a misallocation of ownership slows down growth. Cooley, Marimon and
Quadrini (2014) investigate the long-run aggregate implications of corporate governance frictions
inside nancial rms. In particular, they study the e¤ects of nancial managersrisk taking, when
this risk taking inuences the value of managersoutside option. Our paper is also related more
broadly to the literature on the impact of imperfect nancial markets on growth (see, e.g., Aghion,
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005; Cooley and Quadrini, 2001; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990, and
Bencivenga and Smith, 1991).
From a modelling point of view, because our goal is to understand how corporate governance
a¤ects both the behavior of entrepreneurs in establishing new rms and the investment decisions
of incumbent rms, we build on the literature that has extended models of endogenous growth to
include endogenous market structure (see, e.g., Peretto, 1996 and 1999, and, for a recent survey,
Etro, 2009). A further important feature of this class of models is the neutrality of the aggregate
size of the market with respect to the long-run growth of per capita income. This neutrality implies
that fundamentals and policy variables that work through the size of the aggregate market have
no growth e¤ects, whereas fundamentals and policy variables that reallocate resources between
incumbentsinvestment and rm entry do have long-run growth e¤ects (see, e.g., Peretto, 1998 and
1999; Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1998; Young, 1998; Howitt, 1999).2 This feature is particularly
useful for our purposes because it allows us to study the impact of corporate governance reforms
in an economy with growing population and an expanding array of products.
Finally, the paper also relates to the literature that studies the investment distortions induced
by corporate governance frictions. Immordino and Pagano (2012) examine the impact of managers
empire building in a partial equilibrium model where managers can either be incentivized through
the participation to rmsequity or be audited by active shareholders. We follow a similar approach
2Empirical support for these results can be found in Laincz and Peretto (2006), Sedgley (2006), Madsen (2008)
and Ulku (2007). See also Aghion and Howitt (1998, 2006), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999), Jones (1999), and
Peretto and Smulders (2002) for reviews.
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in modelling managersincentive structure and the role of active shareholders. Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2008) investigate rmsinvestment decisions over the business cycle when managers derive private
benets from the capital under their control, due, for instance, to empire building motives. A few
static partial equilibrium studies suggest that the agency costs structure of businesses in emerging
countries prompts them to pursue aggressive investment policies (see, e.g., Bebchuk, Kraakman and
Triantis, 1999; Lee, 2000). Indeed, several empirical studies nd that in middle-income countries
business group a¢ liates exhibit higher investment and growth rates than normal (see, e.g., Campbell
and Keys, 2002, and Choi and Cowing, 1999), while the evidence about their relative protability is
generally ambiguous (see, e.g., Khanna and Palepu, 2000, and Bertrand, Metha and Mullainathan,
2002).
3 The model: real sector
The economy is closed. There is a nal good and a continuum of non-durable intermediate goods.
To keep things simple, there is no physical capital. All variables are functions of (continuous)
time but to simplify the notation we omit the time argument unless necessary to avoid confusion.
The intermediate sector is the gist of our economy: rms enter the industry by developing new
intermediate goods while incumbent rms invest in the quality of existing intermediate goods. The
intermediate sector is plagued by corporate governance frictions.
3.1 Households
The economy is populated by a representative household with L (t) = L0et, L0  1, members,
each endowed with one unit of labor. In addition to providing labor services, household members
can also provide managerial and monitoring services inside rms.3 The household has preferences
U (t) =
Z 1
t
e ( )s log

C (s)
L (s)

ds;  >   0 (1)
where t is the point in time when the household makes decisions,  is the discount rate and C is
consumption. The household supplies labor inelastically and thus faces the ow budget constraint
_A = rA+ wL  C; (2)
where A is assets holding, r is the rate of return on assets and w is the wage. The intertemporal
consumption plan that maximizes (1) subject to (2) consists of the Euler equation
r =   + _C=C; (3)
the budget constraint (2) and the usual boundary conditions.
3Such services are not in units of labor and thus their provision does not come out of labor supply.
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3.2 Final producers
A competitive representative rm produces a nal good (the numeraire) that can be consumed, used
to produce intermediate goods, invested in the improvement of the quality of existing intermediate
goods, or invested in the creation of new intermediate goods. The technology for the production
of the nal good is
Y =
Z N
0
Xi

Zi Z
1  L
N1 
1 
di; 0 < ;  < 1; 0   < 1 (4)
where Y is the nal output, N is the mass of intermediate goods andXi is the quantity of intermedi-
ate good i used in production. Given the inelastic labor supply of the household and the one-sector
structure of the economy, labor market clearing yields that employment in the nal sector equals
population size L. Quality is the ability of an intermediate good to raise the productivity of the
other factors: the contribution of intermediate good i depends on its own quality, Zi, and on the
average quality, Z =
R N
0 (Zj=N) dj, of intermediate goods. Social returns to quality and variety
are equal to 1 and , respectively. The rst-order conditions for the prot maximization problem
of the nal producer yield that each intermediate rm i faces the demand curve
Xi =


Pi
 1
1 
Zi Z
1  L
N1 
; (5)
where Pi is the price of intermediate good i. The rst-order conditions then imply that the nal
producer pays total compensationZ N
0
PiXidi = Y and wL = (1  )Y (6)
to intermediate goods and labor suppliers, respectively.
3.3 Intermediate producers
The typical intermediate rm i comes into existence when X units of nal good are invested to
set up operations. Because of this sunk entry cost, the rm cannot supply an existing good in
Bertrand competition with the incumbent monopolist but must introduce a new intermediate good
that expands product variety. The rm enters at the average quality level and, hence, at average
size (this simplifying assumption preserves symmetry of equilibrium at all times).
Once in existence, the intermediate rm i operates a technology that requires one unit of nal
good per unit of intermediate good produced and a xed operating cost Zi Z
1 , also in units of
nal good. The rm can increase the quality of its intermediate good according to the technology
_Zi = Ii; (7)
where Ii is the rms investment, in units of nal good. Using (5), the rms net prot is
i =
"
(Pi   1)


Pi
 1
1  L
N1 
  
#
Zi Z
1    Ii: (8)
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Absent corporate governance frictions, after entry at time t the rm would choose for s 2 [t;1)
paths of the products price, Pi (s), and investment, Ii (s), that maximize the value of the rm
Vi (t) =
Z 1
t
e 
R s
t r(v)dvi(s)ds; (9)
subject to (7) and (8), and taking the paths of the interest rate, r (s), and of average quality,
Z (s), as given. The entry decision would then be represented by the free-entry condition that the
(maximized) value of the rm equals the entry cost, i.e., Vi (t) = X (t). Our goal is to study how
corporate governance frictions a¤ect economic growth and market structure by causing production,
investment and entry decisions to deviate from this frictionless case.
4 Corporate governance
We are interested in capturing conicts of interest between managers and shareholders on one
side, and between active and minority (passive) shareholders on the other side. We posit that the
investment, production and pricing decisions of an intermediate rm are made by a manager. The
manager maximizes his own objective function, which is not aligned with the objective function of
the shareholders of the rm. We focus on two types of frictions: a tunnelingfriction, such that
managers siphon o¤ resources from rms; and an empire building friction such that managers
derive private benets from expanding the size of rms. These are the two frictions considered by
Nikolov and Whited (2013) and a large body of corporate governance literature. Most importantly,
these are the corporate governance frictions that have allegedly plagued several countries in recent
decades (see, e.g., Khanna, 2000; Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005; Campbell and Keys, 2002;
Choi and Cowing, 1999).
The decisions of the manager of an intermediate rm can be monitored by the active shareholder
of the rm. However, we posit that, in turn, the active shareholder cannot commit vis-à-vis the
minority shareholders of the rm.
4.1 Managers
Following Nikolov and Whited (2013), we let the compensation package of a manager consist of
an equity share, em;i, of the rm. The manager can also steal a fraction i (Mi; Si) of the net
prot i, where Si is the managers e¤ort in tunneling (stealing) activities and Mi is the e¤ort of
the rms active shareholder in monitoring the manager. We assume @i (Mi; Si) =@Si > 0 and
@i (Mi; Si) =@Mi < 0. The managers e¤ort cost of engaging in tunneling is cS(Si) i, where the
function cS(Si) satises @cS(Si)=@Si > 0, @2cS(Si)=@S2i  0. As in Nikolov and Whited (2013), on
top of the conicts with shareholders stemming from his tunneling activity, a managers objectives
can also depart from the shareholdersobjectives due to an innate taste of the manager for building
empires. We model such an empire building attitude by letting the manager derive private benets
from the rms gross volume of earnings. Formally, we write the managers utility ow as
em;i (1  i (Mi; Si)) + i (Mi; Si)  cS(Si)
  (i +
PiXi) (10)
8
Thus, a manager derives an extra utility from the volume of gross earnings PiXi (a proxy for the
rms size). The parameter 
  0 governs the size of private benets and, hence, the intensity
of the empire building friction. For computational tractability, as (10) illustrates, we let the size
preference of the manager be proportional to the portion of net prot accruing to him (the term
in square brackets).
At time t, given the path of his shareholding, em;i (s), and the path of monitoring of the active
shareholder, Mi (s), for s 2 [t;1), the manager of the rm chooses the paths of price Pi(s),
investment Ii(s), and stealing e¤ort Si (s), to maximizeZ +1
t
e 
R s
t r(v)dv

em;i (1  i (Mi; Si)) + i (Mi; Si)  cS(Si)

[i +
PiXi] ds:
This expression makes clear that, due to tunneling and empire building, the managers objective
is not the maximization of the value of the rm Vi (t) dened in (9). By contrast, he forms the
following Hamiltonian
Hi =

em;i (1  i (Mi; Si)) + i (Mi; Si)  cS(Si)
  [i +
PiXi] + qiIi;
where qi is the shadow value of the marginal increase in product quality. In the Technical Appendix,
we report the full set of rst-order conditions with respect to Pi, Ii, Zi, and Si. The rst-order
condition with respect to Pi yields
Pi =
1
1 + 

1

: (11)
This condition highlights the managers incentive to underprice the intermediate good relative to
the frictionless monopoly value 1= in order to boost the size of the rm. Combining this result
with the rst-order conditions for Ii and Zi, we obtain an expression for the rate of return to
investment:
rZ = 
"
1
(1 + 
)
  1

Xi
Zi
  

Z
Zi
1 #
+
_qi
qi
: (12)
This expression illustrates the distortion in the return to investment due to the managers prefer-
ence for current gross earnings (empire building). This distortion results in a gross prot margin
(Pi  MC) =MC = (Pi   1) that is smaller than the frictionless one,
 
1
   1

.4 To ensure that the
pricing decision is economically meaningful, we impose the restriction  (1 + 
) < 1.
The rst-order condition for the tunneling e¤ort Si says that the manager sets the marginal
benet of his tunneling e¤ort equal to its marginal cost,
(1  em;i) @i (Mi; Si)
@Si
=
@cS(Si)
@Si
: (13)
The marginal benet is given by the marginal increase in the net prot that the manager diverts
from the share 1   em;i that the ownership structure allocates to the shareholders. Note that a
4This is in line with the nding of some empirical studies that, controlling for market structure and other factors,
empire building motives tend to depress rm protability.
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higher equity share em;i of the manager discourages tunneling because the manager would merely
make costly e¤ort to steal from himself. Thus, the managers equity share em;i is a rst tool through
which the managers tunneling can be mitigated.
4.2 Active shareholders
At the foundation of an intermediate rm, we let a household member (the active shareholder of the
rm) nance a share 1  of the entry cost X and borrow the funds needed to cover the remaining
portion  of the entry cost from other household members (the minority or passive shareholders).
The active shareholder can monitor and mitigate the tunneling of the rms manager. However,
to capture conicts between active and minority shareholders, we posit that the active shareholder
maximizes his own objective function rather than the value of the rm. Put di¤erently, an active
shareholder cannot commit to a given level of monitoring but must be provided with incentives to
monitor through the participation to the prots of the rm. We let ea;i denote the equity share of
the active shareholder.
The e¤ort cost of monitoring faced by an active shareholder is cM (Mi; i)  i, where i 
i=Xi is the rms prot rate (prot to output ratio). This specication allows the cost of mon-
itoring per unit of prot monitored to be a function of the rmsprot rate. This specication
is thus exible enough that we can study a scenario in which the monitoring technology of active
shareholders has the same e¤ectiveness regardless of the amount of prots to be monitored and
also a scenario in which larger rms with larger prots are harder to monitor (because there are
diseconomies to scale in the monitoring technology). At time t, given the paths Si (s), Pi(s), Ii(s)
and ea;i (s), for s 2 [t;1), the active shareholder chooses the path of monitoringMi (s) to maximizeZ +1
t
e 
R s
t r(v)dv

ea;i (s) [1  i (Mi; Si)]  cM (Mi (s) ; is)

i(s)ds:
Solving for the rst-order condition with respect to Mi,
 ea;i@i (Mi; Si)
@Mi
=
@cM (Mi; i)
@Mi
: (14)
This conveys a similar intuition as the rst-order condition (13) for the managers tunneling. The
equity share ea;i of the active shareholder determines the extent to which the active shareholder
monitors and mitigates the managers tunneling.
4.3 Minority (passive) shareholders
Minority (passive) shareholders co-nance the foundation of an intermediate rm covering a portion
 of its entry cost. Because any household member can found (be the active shareholder of) a new
rm, entry of new intermediate rms occurs until household members can be induced to contribute
to the cost of funding new rms as minority shareholders. Put di¤erently, entry occurs until, at the
equity allocation that maximizes their expected discounted ow of dividends from an intermediate
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rm, minority shareholdersparticipation constraint holds as an equality. Then, the only decision
at the foundation of an intermediate rm is about the paths em;i(s) and ea;i(s) of the equity shares
to be allocated to the manager and to the active shareholder in order to induce the behavior that
maximizes the value of the minority shareholdersstake in the rm.
To develop the formal structure of this problem, we think of the rst-order conditions (13) and
(14) for tunneling and monitoring as reaction functions that at time s  t yield a Nash equilibrium
that is the solution of the pair of equations (dropping the s index of calendar time for simplicity)
(1  em;i) @i (Mi (em;i; ea;i) ; Si (em;i; ea;i))
@Si
=
@cS(Si)
@Si
;
 ea;i@i (Mi (em;i; ea;i) ; Si (em;i; ea;i))
@Mi
=
@cM (Mi; i)
@Mi
:
Given the assumptions on the function i (Mi; Si), these two equations yield a pair (Mi; Si) that
depends on the equity shares of manager and active shareholder, em;i, ea;i, and on the prot rate i.
We thus can write i (Mi (em;i; ea;i; i) ; Si (em;i; ea;i; i)) = i (em;i; ea;i; i). Using this function,
we can write the problem at the foundation of an intermediate rm as maximize
V minorityi (t) =
Z +1
t
e 
R s
t r(v)dv [1  em;i(s)  ea;i(s)] [1  i ((em;i (s) ; ea;i (s) ; i (s)))] i(s)ds
subject to the participation constraint
X (t)  V minorityi (t): (15)
On the left-hand side, X (t) is the contribution of the minority shareholders to the cost of entry.
Given our assumption that the minority shareholders take as given the paths Mi(s), Si (s), Pi(s),
Ii(s), Zi (s), Z (s), Xi (s)  and thus i (s)  the problem does not have a dynamic constraint
and thus reduces to a sequence of identical problems where the objective is to maximize (for any
s)
[1  em;i(s)  ea;i(s)] [1  i (em;i (s) ; ea;i (s) ; i (s))] :
The solution of this problem yields a pair of functions em;i(i), ea;i(i) that allow us to dene
(i)  [1  em;i(i)  ea;i(i)] [1  i (em;i(i); ea;i(i); i)] : (16)
The term (i) fully captures the consequences of tunneling for the minority shareholders: at any
time s, given the volume of net prot i(s) of the rm, minority shareholders receive only a fraction
(i) of such prots as dividends. The implications for the entry decision are as follows.
The participation constraint of minority shareholders (15), taken with the equality sign, gives us
the free-entry condition for the economy with corporate governance frictions, X (t) = V minorityi (t).
5
Taking logs and time derivatives yields the return to entry
rN =
(i)i
V minorityi
+
_V minorityi
V minorityi
=
(i)

i
X
+
_X
X
: (17)
5We can always set 1   small enough that the active shareholders participation constraint is slack.
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This expression shows that the return to entry equals the dividend price ratio plus capital gains/losses.
The dividend features the leakage term () dened above which captures the two channels
through which the tunneling distortion manifests itself. The rst channel is direct: the minority
shareholders earn only a fraction 1   ea;i(:)   em;i(:) of the dividend ow. The second channel is
indirect: given the shares (1   ea;i(:)   em;i(:), ea;i(:), em;i(:)), the manager and the active share-
holder make stealing and monitoring decisions that result in a share  (:) of the net prots being
diverted from dividend distribution to the managers pockets.
Example 1 provides analytical results on the mechanism just discussed. In the remainder of the
analysis, we will make use of active shareholdersmonitoring function specied in the example.
Example 1 Let the stealing function and the cost of stealing and monitoring respectively be:
i (Mi; Si) = S log (1 + Si)  M log (1 +Mi) ; (18)
cM (Mi) = (M + i)M and c
S(Si) = SSi: (19)
Assume
S > M and 1  (S   M )  S log

S
S

+ M log

M
S

+ M log

M
M + i

< 0:
The equilibrium with an interior solution for em;i, ea;i; Si;Mi and i is characterized by the fol-
lowing expressions for em;i and ea;i
em;i = 1  exp
8<:1  (S   M )  S log

S
S

+ M log

M
S

+ M log

M
M+i

S   M
9=; 2 (0; 1) ;
(20)
ea;i = (1  em;i) M
S
2 (0; 1) : (21)
Conversely, if for the given set of parameters, the expressions for em;i and ea;i imply i < 0, then
the equilibrium is characterized by Si =Mi = em;i = ea;i = 0 and, hence, by  = 1 (no tunneling).
Proof. See the Technical Appendix.
5 General equilibrium
Having solved for agentsdecisions, we can now focus on the allocation of nal output Y to con-
sumption and production of intermediate goods, derive the resulting general equilibrium system
and characterize the steady state. We will study dynamics in Sections 6-8.
5.1 Structure of the equilibrium
Intermediate rms receive N  PX = Y from the nal producer. Imposing symmetry in the
production function (4) and using this result to eliminate X yields
Y =


P
 
1 
NZL: (22)
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The denition of prot (8) and equations (12) and (17) show that the returns to investment and
to entry depend on the quality-adjusted gross cash ow of the rm (P   1)X=Z  i.e., revenues
minus variable production costs, all scaled by quality.6 Using (22), we thus write both returns as
functions of
(P   1)X
Z
= (P   1) 
P
Y
NZ
= (P   1)


P
 1
1  L
N1 
: (23)
We dene x  L=N1  and use it as our state variable. We can think of x as a proxy for rm size.
Substitution of expression (23) in (12) and (17) yields the following expressions for the returns
to incumbentsinvestment and to rmsentry:
rZ = 
"
(P   1)


P
 1
1 
x  
#
+
_qi
qi
; (24)
rN =
()

 

P
 1
1 
"
(P   1)


P
 1
1 
  + z
x
#
+
_x
x
+ z: (25)
These two equations show that the returns to investment and to entry are critically inuenced by
the corporate governance frictions captured by () and P = 1= (1 + 
). Specically, the empire
building problem (
) reduces both the return to investment (24) and the return to entry (25) by
reducing the quality-adjusted gross prot margin (P   1)X=Z. Moreover, empire building reduces
the return to entry because managersdecision to price low enlarges the volume of production X
and thus raises the cost of entry. Finally, the return to entry is decreasing in the severity of the
tunneling problem (1 (:)): with no tunneling (:) = 1, with tunneling (:) < 1. Tunneling acts
as a barrier to rm entry, forcing minority shareholders not only to sustain standard technological
entry costs, but also to surrender expected returns to managers and active shareholders to mitigate
resource diversion inside rms.
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium e¤ects of corporate governance frictions,
we derive an expression for the GDP of our economy, denoted by G. Subtracting the cost of
intermediate production from the nal output Y and using (23),
G = Y  N (X + Z) =

1  
P

1 +
Z
X

Y =
241  
P
0@1 +  

P
 1
1  x
1A35Y;
where P = 1= (1 + 
) . GDP per capita thus equals
G
L
=


P
 
1 
| {z }
nal demand (static)

241  
P
0@1 +  

P
 1
1  x
1A35
| {z }
intermediate e¢ ciency (static IRS)
 NZ| {z }
intermediate technology (dynamic IRS)
: (26)
This expression decomposes GDP per capita in three terms. The rst captures the role of the
pricing decision in locating rms on their demand curve, thus determining their scale of activity.
6This scaling is required to make variables stationary in steady state.
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The second captures the existence of static economies of scale, which imply that larger rms produce
at lower average cost. The third captures the role of product variety and product quality, which
evolve over time according to the behavior of agents dictated by the returns discussed above.
5.2 The steady state
We now turn to the characterization of the steady state. Householdssaving behavior yields
r = +

1   + z
: (27)
Substituting this expression in the return to entry (25) and observing that, from its denition, the
prot rate is given by  = (P   1)   +zx
 

P
  1
1  , we obtain the prot rate needed to deliver to
minority shareholders their required rate of return
 = arg solve

+

1   =
()



: (28)
Having obtained  from equalizing the return to equity of minority shareholders with their reser-
vation rate of return to saving, we can solve for the other variables of interest by substituting (27)
into the returns to investment (24) and to entry (25). We obtain
z =  (P   1)


P
 1
1 
x    

+

1  

; (CI)
z =
24(P   1) 
P
 1
1 
  
 

P
 1
1 
()

+

1  
35x   : (EI)
The rst curve, which we call the corporate investment (CI) locus, describes the steady-state rate
of investment z  _Z=Z that incumbent intermediate rms generate given the rm size x that they
expect to hold in equilibrium. The second curve, which we call the entry (EI) locus, describes the
steady-state investment rate z that equalizes the return to entry and the return to investment given
the value of x that both entrants and incumbents expect to hold in equilibrium. The steady state
is the intersection of these two curves in the (x; z) space. After some algebra,7
x =
(1  ) 

+ 1 

(1  ) (P   1)  ()

+ 1 
  
P
  1
1 
; (29)
z =
h
+

+ 1 
i

()    (P   1)
(1  ) (P   1)  ()

+ 1 
 + 
1  

; (30)
7Existence and stability of this steady state require the intercept condition that the EI curve starts out below the
CI curve and the slope condition that the EI curve is steeper than the CI curve. Together they say that intersection
exists with the EI line cutting the CI line from below. The restrictions on the parameters that guarantee this
conguration are those stated in Propositions 2-3, that yield the global stability of the economys dynamics.
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where P = 1= (1 + 
). The steady state rate of rm entry (variety growth) that guarantees that
the rms size x  L=N1  is constant in the long run equals
n 
 
_N
N
!
=

1   : (31)
From equation (26), we obtain the growth rate of the per capita nal output and GDP as 
_Y
Y
!
   =
 
_G
G
!
   = 
1   + z
: (32)
Figures 2 and 3 show key properties of the model in steady state by plotting the CI locus and the
EI locus, against x. For example, imagine that the government or the nancial regulator enact a
policy that accommodates the informational opacity of rms in nancial markets or that inhibits the
monitoring activity of active shareholders, favoring managersdiversion of resources. This policy
change could be captured by a reduction in the monitoring e¢ ciency of active shareholders, M ,
or by a drop in managerscost of stealing cS(Si). Either shock would lead to an intensication of
tunneling 1 (:), that is to a reduction of (:), the share of net prots appropriated by minority
shareholders. Figure 2 shows that the drop in  makes the EI locus shift down (rotate clockwise):
for a given rm size x, a lower  reduces the investment rate z that regulates the arbitrage entry
condition. Intuitively, the expenditures on investment must drop to compensate for the fall in the
share of prots that can be appropriated by the rm minority shareholders. The intensication
of tunneling does not a¤ect the CI locus, though, because it equally erodes returns and costs of
investment. As Figure 2 shows, the overall e¤ect of the shock is both a greater steady-state rm
size and larger rate of investment of incumbent rms. Put di¤erently, an increase in the severity
of the tunneling problem prompts incumbents to invest more aggressively but makes the industry
structure more concentrated, inducing a fall in product variety.
The magnitude of the shift produced by the shock depends on the specication of active share-
holdersmonitoring technology. We have seen that this technology can be specied in a way such
that active shareholdersmonitoring has always the same e¤ectiveness or alternatively in a way
such that larger rms with larger prots are harder to monitor. For instance, if, as in Example 1,
cM (Mi) = (M+i)M , one can think of cases in which  > 0 or  = 0: In the Technical Appendix
(see Steady State and Monitoring Technologies), we demonstrate that a shock to any parameter
that increases the intensity of tunneling 1   (:) makes the EI locus rotate clockwise relatively
more when the marginal cost of monitoring is increasing in the prot rate ( > 0) than when it is
not ( = 0). Thus, the shock induces a larger increase in rmssize x and in the investment rate
z when  > 0. Intuitively, when  > 0 the increase in rmssize induced by the intensication
of managerstunneling reduces the e¤ectiveness of active shareholdersmonitoring. This tends to
further exacerbate the intensity of tunneling 1 (:), which in turn further spurs x and z. Thus,
when there are diseconomies to scale in monitoring, a multiplier e¤ect is at work, due to a mutually
reinforcing interaction between the degree of consolidation of the market structure and the intensity
of managerstunneling.
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The e¤ects of an increase in the intensity 
 of empire building are displayed in Figure 3.
Again, this shock could be interpreted as the outcome of a policy that favors managersempire
building behavior. An increase in 
 pushes both the EI and CI loci down because the empire
building friction lowers the quality-adjusted gross prot margin (P   1)X=Z and raises the cost of
entry X. Intuitively, both the rate of return to entry and to investment fall because managers
price decisions are more distorted. Thus, for given rm size x the expenditure on investment
consistent with equalization of the returns of investment and of entry to the reservation rate of
return of shareholders must fall. Since both loci shift down, we have a potentially ambiguous
e¤ect. However, our algebra reveals that the increase in 
 unambiguously spurs the investment
rate z and thus must increase rm size x; see Figure 3 for an illustration. As a result of the shock,
therefore, the industry structure becomes more concentrated because that is what is required to
have rms that invest more aggressively.
6 Dynamics and welfare: Analytical results
When active shareholderscost of monitoring does not depend on the prot rate (in Example 1
when  = 0), the dynamics of the economy can be traced back to that of one state variable, the
rms size x. Exploiting this property, in this section we provide an analytical background for the
quantitative experiments of the next sections on the e¤ects of corporate governance shocks. We
defer to Section 8 the analysis of the case in which the marginal cost of monitoring is increasing in
the prot rate ( > 0 in Example 1).
An interesting feature of the dynamics that will emerge in this section is the evolution of the
economy through three stages of development. In the most advanced stage, there is both entry
of new rms and investment of incumbent rms. In earlier stages of development, either entry or
investment or both, can be zero. We begin with a useful result on the consumption ratio.
Proposition 1 Let c  C=Y be the economys consumption ratio. In equilibrium,
c =
8><>: 1   +

P
"
(P   1)  +z
( P )
1
1  x
#
n = 0 z  0
1   + ( ) P ; n > 0 z  0
: (33)
Proof. See the Technical Appendix.
Proposition 1 identies two regimes. In one, (our proxy for) rm size x is too small and there
is no entry, in which case the consumption ratio is increasing in x because rms earn escalating
rents (uncontested by entrants) from the growing market size (recall that we postulate population
growth). In the other regime, rm size x is su¢ ciently large and there is entry, in which case the
rents are capped and the consumption ratio is constant.
Proposition 2 examines the evolution of the rm size across the three stages of development.
16
Proposition 2 There exists a nite threshold rm size xN that triggers entry and a nite threshold
xZ that triggers investment by incumbents (see the proof for the expressions of xN and xZ). Assume:
(P   1) >  (  )

; (34)
 
(P   1)


P
 1
1 
xN   
!0@  

 

P
 1
1  xN
1A < (1  ) + ; (35)
1 >


 

P
 1
1  xN
: (36)
Then, xN < xZ and in equilibrium the rates of investment and entry are
z (x) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0   x  xN
0 xN < x  xZ
(P 1)( P )
1
1  x 
0@  
( P )
1
1  x
1A (1 ) 
1  
( P )
1
1  x
xz < x <1
; (37)
n (x) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0   x  xN

( P )
1
1 

(P   1)   P  11    x  +  xN < x  xZ

( P )
1
1 

(P   1)   P  11    +z(x)x   +  xz < x <1
: (38)
Firm size obeys the di¤erential equation
_x
x
= 	(x)    (1  )n (x) : (39)
Proof. See the Technical Appendix.
The technical assumptions (34)-(36) allow us to focus on the most interesting sequence of
development in which rm entry becomes active before incumbents start investing. Assumption (34)
says that the threshold xN for entry is nite. Assumption (35) says that when the economy crosses
the threshold xN and activates entry, investment is not yet protable and it takes additional growth
of rm size x to activate it (xN < xZ). Assumption (36) says that when the economy crosses the
threshold xZ the no-arbitrage condition that returns be equalized if both entry and investment are
to take place identies a stable Nash equilibrium (see also the proof of the proposition). Proposition
3 states the formal result, including the condition that ensures that the economy does cross xZ .
Proposition 3 Assume

1   +  >


 

P
 1
1 
 
(P   1)


P
 1
1 
  
xZ
!
; (40)
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lim
x!1	(x) = limx!1

+

1    


(1  ) (P   1)

< 0: (41)
There exists a unique equilibrium trajectory: given initial condition x0 the economy converges to
the steady state x.
Proof. See the Technical Appendix.
For x  xN < xZ , _x=x =  and therefore the economy crosses the threshold for entry in nite
time in light of assumption (34) that guarantees that xN is nite. For xN < x < xZ ,
_x
x
= + (1  )   (1  ) 

 

P
 1
1 
 
(P   1)


P
 1
1 
  
x
!
: (42)
Therefore, the economy crosses the threshold for investment in nite time since x is still growing at
x = xZ in light of assumption (40).8 Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of x across the three stages
of development.
The next sections will study the dynamic response of the economy to shocks to corporate
governance frictions as well the welfare e¤ects of the shocks. As we prove in the Technical Appendix
using (1), the welfare change induced by a shock to one or more corporate governance friction
parameters is related to the detrended patterns of the entry rate n and of the investment rate z as
follows (the value of an object after the shock is indicated with a "0")
U = log(
0

)| {z }
initial
+
Z +1
0
e ( )t
Z t
0
fn0(s)ds+z0(s)]| {z }
transition
gdt+
Z +1
0
e ( )tz| {z }
long-run
dt (43)
where   [1    + ( ) P ]
 

P
 
1  , n0(s)  n(x(s))   n0, z0(s)  z(x(s))   z0, z 
z0   z. The expression in (43) shows that a corporate governance shock a¤ects welfare through
three channels: an initial level e¤ect associated with an immediate (and permanent) change of the
consumption-output ratio; a transitional e¤ect associated with the adjustment of the entry rate
and of the investment rate to the new conditions (with both investment and entry detrended with
their post-shock values); and a long-run e¤ect that accounts for the permanent changes caused by
the shock (that is, capturing the welfare change that would be observed if the adjustments were
to occur immediately after the shock). All the terms in (43) depend on the state variable x(t).
Therefore, the evolution of the welfare change can be linked to time through x(t).
An advantage of the closed form solution of the dynamics of x is that we can also obtain
analytical results for the impact of corporate governance shocks on welfare. In particular, we can
prove the following:
8Note that xZ is always nite so, given population growth, the economy can fail to cross it only if there is
premature market saturation due to entry. The intuition behind the dynamics is that we have chosen a conguration
of parameters such that the quality-adjusted gross protability of rms, (P   1)X=Z, rises throughout the range
[; xZ ]. Consequently, the dissipation of protability due to entry gains su¢ cient force to induce convergence to a
constant value of x only in the region where rms have already activated investment.
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Proposition 4 Consider the transition path of an economy that starts at time 0 with initial condi-
tion x0 > xZ and converges to x. Under the approximation =
 

P
 1
1  x = 0 (i.e., x su¢ ciently
large), x evolves according to the linear di¤erential equation
_x =   (x   x) ; (44)
where
  (1  )

(1  ) (P   1) 

 

+

1  

: (45)
Therefore, the explicit solution for the economys path is
x (t) = x0e
 t + x
 
1  e t : (46)
Using this result when integrating (43), the welfare change induced by a shock that a¤ects one or
more parameters can be rewritten as9
U =
1
  flog(
0

) +

z
0   z

  x
 (P 0   1)   P 0  11  + 01 
  +  0 (
x0
x
  1)g: (47)
Proof. See the Technical Appendix.
7 Calibration and response to shocks
In this section and the next, we conduct experiments to study quantitatively the dynamic adjust-
ment of the economy when it is hit by shocks to corporate governance frictions. These shocks
can be thought as the e¤ects of policy reforms, for example. In recent decades, a large number
of corporate governance reforms have been enacted in advanced and emerging economies. These
reforms have modied the rules governing the activity of auditors, the composition and prerogatives
of boards of directors, the allocation of power among corporate stakeholders, the punishment of
corporate frauds, the disclosure requirements in capital markets (OECD, 2012).
In this section, we study quantitatively the dynamics investigated analytically in the previous
section for the case in which active shareholderscost of monitoring does not depend on the prot
rate. In Section 8, we will study quantitatively the dynamics for the case in which active sharehold-
erscost of monitoring does depend on the prot rate. In both sections, we conduct experiments
focusing on the most advanced stage of development (x > xZ) in which both rm entry and in-
cumbentsinvestment take place, that is, n > 0 and z > 0. We defer the reader to Section 9 for
a quantitative analysis of the e¤ects of corporate governance frictions on the long-run evolution of
the economy through earlier stages of development in which either investment (xN < x < xZ) or
both entry and investment (x < xN ) do not take place.
9Since we are mostly interested in corporate governance shocks, this expression excludes shocks to ; ; ; ;and
. A generalized expression for U can be found in the Technical Appendix.
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7.1 Calibration
Table 1, Panel A, displays the chosen parameterization of the baseline economy. The population
growth rate  is set equal to 1:21 percent, which corresponds to the average population growth
rate in the United States from 1910 to 2009 (Maddison data). The value of  is inferred from
comparing the private return on capital with the social return to investment in product quality. If
the investment decisions were taken by internalizing the spillover e¤ects of investment, the return
would be 1= times the private return (see (24)). Jones andWilliams (1998) survey several empirical
studies that put the rate of return on R&D (a proxy for investment in product quality) in the range
of 30-100 percent. Using a conservative lower bound of 30% for the social return and a private rate
of return on capital of 5%, we set  equal to 1/6.
The parameter 
 that governs managersempire building is set equal to 0:1%, in the ballpark
of the estimates of Nikolov and Whited (2013) for the United States. The monopolistic price P
is set to 1.3, following the empirical literature on the Lerner index. As a result, if 
 = 0:1%, the
corresponding value of the parameter  is 0:768. Because we target a long-run growth rate of per
capita income of 2% and an interest rate of 5%, the discount rate, , is set to 0.03.
The social return to variety, , is pinned down by the steady state relationship (31),  = 1 =n.
Laincz and Peretto (2006) observe that in recent years the net entry rate of establishments in the
U.S. manufacturing sector has roughly been equal to the population growth rate, implying  = 0.
According to the World Bank Entrepreneurship database, in 2005 rm entry and exit rates in the
United States were 12.5 and 10 percent, respectively, implying a net entry rate n of 2.5% and
 = 0:5. We pick a value of  in the middle of the interval, letting  = 0:25. Then, the associated
entry rate n is 1.61 percent.
The four parameters that jointly determine the intensity of managerstunneling and of active
shareholdersmonitoring, M , S , M , S , can hardly be identied separately. We then settled on a
set of values that induce a level of tunneling ( = 0:2%) of the order of magnitude of that estimated
by Nikolov and Whited (2013) for the United States, to have active monitoring (ea > 0), and to
have an equity share 1  em   ea of minority (passive) shareholders of about 3/4. Supplementary
Figure A1 in the Appendix helps understand how the steady state allocation of equity shares among
managers, active and minority shareholders changes depending on a key parameter, M , capturing
active shareholdersmonitoring e¢ ciency. Finally, the values of  and  are chosen to match a
balanced growth rate of per capita gross nal output, y = _Y =Y , of 2% and a saving rate s of 10%,
as suggested again by the U.S. experience (the saving rate is dened as the fraction of the GDP
not consumed, i.e., s = 1  C=G).10 Since z = y   n (see (31) and (32)), the baseline investment
rate z is 1.60 percent, nearly the same as the net entry rate n (1.61 percent).
10According to data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis the gross national saving rate in the post-war period
uctuated between 15% and 20%. Allowing for a depreciation rate of 5-10 percent, we obtain a net saving rate, as a
ratio of GDP, in the interval of 5-15 percent. Our calibration delivers a saving rate in the middle of this interval.
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7.2 Response to shocks
We study the impulse responses to variations in the parameters that govern the intensity of the
empire building friction or of the tunneling friction (in each experiment, we change only one parame-
ter). Consistent with their interpretation as structural policy reforms, all the shocks are permanent
and are perceived as such. For simplicity, we also assume they are not anticipated. We posit that
the baseline parameter values are as in Table 1, Panel A. Our main objective is to disentangle the
short- and long-run consequences of an alteration of the friction parameters both on incumbents
investment and on the entry of new rms. An important result that emerges is that a given corpo-
rate governance shock can have asymmetric consequences on the two sources of growth (entry and
investment): it may depress one but boost the other.
In interpreting the dynamic responses to the shocks presented below, it is important to keep in
mind that the economy without corporate governance frictions is not a rst-best environment. First,
the presence of monopolistic power in the intermediate sector generates a classic static ine¢ ciency
that translates into a sub-optimal level of production. Second, an incumbent intermediate rm can
appropriate only a fraction of the return of its own investment, while beneting from the investment
of other rms. Therefore, the decentralized equilibrium solution implies levels of investment lower
than those that would be chosen by a social planner. In principle, corporate governance frictions
can then be benecial if they mitigate the ine¢ ciency of the frictionless economy or harmful if they
exacerbate it.
7.2.1 Empire building
In a rst experiment, we reduce the parameter 
 that governs managersempire building from 0:1%
to zero. This shock can mimic the e¤ect of a policy reform that tightens managerial discipline, for
example. The pre-shock steady state of the economy is summarized in Panel B of Table 1. Figure 5,
which plots the impulse responses, shows that an immediate consequence of the shock is a reduction
of the quantity produced, due to a rise in the monopolistic price (recall that P = 1(1+
)). Because
the price is brought to the optimal monopolistic level of the frictionless economy, prots expand.
This is a positive development not only from the perspective of incumbent rms but also from
that of potential entrants. Indeed, lured by the higher prots, households found more rms. The
resulting expansion of the array of intermediate goods favors productivity growth in the nal good
sector. This entry e¤ect can be strong enough to displace resources that incumbent intermediate
rms would have allocated to investment in an economy a¤ected by empire building. Specically,
there are two competing forces that shape the response of incumbents investment. On the one
hand, the elimination of the pricing distortion leads rms to produce the prot-maximizing quantity
of intermediate goods. This raises the return to investment, boosting it. On the other hand, the
greater intensity with which new rms ock in causes a reduction of rmsaverage size, prompting
rms to slow down their investment. In this baseline economy, which has a relatively small initial
empire building friction, the latter e¤ect prevails both in the immediate aftermath of the shock
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and in the long run: investment drops in the immediate aftermath of the shock and thereafter
exhibits a slow decline. The saving rate s goes up after the shock, reecting the lower investment
of incumbents which prevails over the additional resources absorbed by the greater number of new
entries. Finally, because after the shock the size of the average rm shrinks, the rate of return on
assets drops, as the bottom left graph of Figure 5 shows.
Equation (43) suggests that we can separate the components of the welfare e¤ect of the shock.
The top-left graph of Figure 10 plots the terms identied in the equation as initial, transition,
and long run(as percentages of their pre-shock value). The bottom U-shaped line captures the
negative long-run welfare e¤ect due to the decline of incumbentsinvestment rate relative to the
baseline economy: formally, it is the discounted log of the consumption ratio of the two economies
growing on their respective long-run paths. Because the shock causes a long-run decline in the per
capita output growth rate, this component of the welfare change is necessarily negative. The top
hump-shaped curve reects the other two components. The rst, captured by the negative intercept
of the curve, is the price increase of intermediate goods due to the drop of 
 (put di¤erently, the
elimination of 
 gives more bite to the monopolistic price distortion). Because of the higher cost of
intermediates, nal good producers contract their production and, as a result, consumerswelfare
goes down (initial consumption component in (43)). But, as noted, the shock also favors the
entry of new rms along the transition, meaning that consumers benet from a greater variety of
intermediate goods (transition component in (43)). In sum, the reduction in the intensity of empire
building leads to a welfare improvement if the transition e¤ect of more intense entry of new rms
is greater than the sum of the long-run negative e¤ect on investment and the initial negative e¤ect
caused by the price increase.11 As Table 2 shows, in the baseline economy with a relatively small
initial empire building distortion, the negative e¤ects tend to prevail.
Next, we aim at gaining a broad picture of the adjustment process that can be expected in
countries characterized by greater freedom of managers in pursuing empire building objectives
(e.g., emerging countries where, as noted, government policies have often favored managersempire
building attitude). Dyck and Zingales (2004) show that the block premium (a proxy for the intensity
of corporate governance frictions) exhibits pronounced variation, with countries such as Brazil and
Indonesia having an average block premium dozens times larger than the United States. And La
Porta et al. (2000) nd a wide cross-country variation in the severity of corporate governance
frictions. Figure 6 and Figure 7 plot the impulse responses as di¤erences from the pre-shock steady
state levels of the baseline economy and of two other economies that di¤er from the baseline only
because the pre-shock value of 
 is higher by 50% and by 50 times, respectively. For comparison
purposes, the gures also display the impulse responses for economies with a higher entry cost
(higher ).12 The long-run outcomes are collected in Table 2.
11Clearly, the slower the transition, the larger the weight we put on the transitional component and the more we
tend to nd a positive welfare e¤ect of the drop of 
.
12One consequence of the high entry cost is a greater saving rate, an implication in line with the observation that
emerging countries save considerably more than the United States (in our example, a 50% increase in the entry cost
leads to a 60% rise of the saving rate).
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The top right plot of Figures 6 and 7 display the entry rate in the decades that follow the shock.
Both in the economy with a slightly higher 
 and in the economy with high 
 the increase in rm
entry is more pronounced than in the baseline economy and, consequently, the decline in rmssize
is faster (in the economy with greater entry cost the outcome is instead more ambiguous). As for
incumbentsinvestment, instead, in contrast with the baseline economy, in the economy with high
initial 
 rmsinvestment rate increases (rather than dropping) in the aftermath of the shock and
remains above the pre-shock steady state value for several years, only eventually dropping below
it (top left plot of the gures). Intuitively, the e¤ect due to the better pricing and production
decisions of managers gains importance, and this tends to boost investment initially (observe also
the initial slight increase in the return on assets).13 In a welfare perspective, in the economy
with high initial 
 this initial boost to incumbentsinvestment adds to the bigger increase in the
entry rate relative to the baseline economy. Together these e¤ects lead to an acceleration of income
growth for several decades implying that in the economy with high initial 
 the positive transitional
welfare component dominates the negative welfare components (see the last three columns, middle
row of Table 2). Thus, welfare increases when the original economy features an important empire
building distortion. The left graph of Figure 11, Panel A, better illustrates this argument: the
graph suggests that the welfare change due to the shock increases monotonically with respect to
the initial level of the 
 friction, implying that economies further away from the United States
along this dimension have the most to gain from policies that contrast managersempire building.
Panel A of Figure 11 also provides a broader view of the welfare consequences of the empire
building shock for economies that di¤er in two other dimensions, the entry cost and the intensity
of tunneling. For example, the right graph of the panel considers the welfare change following the

 shock for economies characterized by di¤erent levels of tunneling, 1 . Interestingly, a greater
exposure to tunneling implies again a larger welfare gain following a reduction in the intensity of
empire building.
7.2.2 Tunneling
In a second set of experiments, we alter the intensity of tunneling by enhancing the e¢ ciency of
active shareholdersmonitoring technology, M . This could mimic the e¤ect of a policy reform that
empowers the monitoring activities of active shareholders, such as institutional investors (Aghion,
Van Reenen and Zingales, 2013). The baseline parameters are again as in Table 1, Panel A. The
size of the shock is chosen to produce a long-run change in the growth rate of output comparable
with that obtained in the baseline 
 experiment. Therefore, by construction, the long-run e¤ects
on z, y, and r, shown in the rst row of Table 3, are the same as in the baseline empire-building ex-
periment. Unlike in the 
 experiment, the allocation of equity shares, the stealing and monitoring
e¤orts, and more in general the tunneling activities, are now a¤ected by the shock.
13The economy with greater entry cost responds relatively more slowly to the shock. This benets welfare for the
slowdown of income growth is more modest at the beginning of the transition. The jump of the saving rate is more
evident in the high-
 and in the high- economy than in the baseline economy.
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The improvement in their monitoring technology induces to allocate a greater equity share
ea to active shareholders, in the attempt to exploit their enhanced monitoring e¢ ciency, and to
reduce the share em awarded to managers. The outcome of this reshu­ ing of equity shares is an
intensication of both monitoring and stealing e¤orts that, while leading to greater stealing (
grows from 0.2 to 0.42 percent), reduces the overall intensity of tunneling. In fact, the fraction
1  of prots surrendered by minority shareholders to managers and to active shareholders drops
because minority shareholders retain a signicantly larger equity share 1   em   ea. As Figure
8 shows, in terms of industry dynamics this reduction in the intensity 1    of tunneling leads
to faster rm entry, which, in turn, causes a downsizing of the average rm. As a result, rms
return on investment goes down. Note that, unlike in the empire-building experiment, in this case
there is no alteration in the static ine¢ ciency due to monopolistic power and, hence, no increase
in the return to investment through this channel. In the long run, the economy will converge to an
equilibrium with more rms of smaller size that devote a relatively smaller share of their sales to
investment.
The welfare e¤ects of the shock are displayed in the bottom-left graph of Figure 10. The decline
of the long-run component of welfare is still caused by the drop of the investment rate, like in the
empire-building experiment (bottom U-shaped line). The source of the welfare benets is still the
greater variety of intermediate goods due to more intense rm entry (top hump-shaped curve). In
contrast with the empire-building experiment, the reduction in the intensity of tunneling does not
alter directly the static ine¢ ciency due to monopolistic power; therefore, the initial component of
the welfare change is muted. Overall, in the baseline economy the long-run and the transitional
components of the welfare change roughly balance each other (see Table 3). An increase in the cost
of stealing (S) or a reduction in the cost of monitoring (M ) or in the ease of stealing (S) have
similar qualitative e¤ects.
As with the set of 
-experiments, especially motivated by the experience of emerging countries,
Figure 9 compares the impulse responses to a monitoring shock in the baseline economy (solid
lines) with the impulse responses of an economy characterized by lower initial monitoring e¢ ciency
M (dotted lines); for comparison, we also consider the impulse responses (dashed lines) for an
economy with higher initial entry cost ( larger by 50% than the baseline). The long-run changes
caused by the monitoring shock in each scenario are in Table 3. As Figure 9 reveals, when the
economy features a higher initial intensity of the tunneling friction (active shareholdersmonitoring
initially less e¢ cient), the improvement in the monitoring technology produces qualitatively similar
but quantitatively smaller e¤ects on the aggregate variables of interest. Specically, an economy
with a lower initial M exhibits a relatively smaller increase in the entry rate, a slower decline in
rmssize, and a smaller drop in the investment rate of incumbents. As in the baseline case, the
long-run and the transitional components of the welfare change roughly balance each other (see
Table 3). But, interestingly, the right graph of Figure 11, Panel B, shows that the lower is the
initial e¢ ciency of the monitoring technology, M , the more welfare-enhancing (or the less welfare-
reducing) the shock. Thus, similar to what observed for the empire-building shock, reforms that
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improve corporate governance benet more economies with poor initial corporate governance than
economies with strong governance.
8 Feedback e¤ects
An important tenet of the literature is that the corporate governance frictions explored in this
paper tend to be more severe in larger rms (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For example,
active shareholdersmonitoring can be more di¢ cult in larger, hence more complex, businesses. To
grasp the implications of this argument, in this section we allow the cost of active shareholders
monitoring to increase with the prots to be monitored ( > 0 in Example 1) and revisit the
economys adjustment process following a permanent reduction of the intensity of empire building
(
). The dynamic response is now more complex because the tunneling activities are a function of
both the investment rate z and rmssize x. To ease the exposition, we assume that during the
transition the consumption-output ratio and the shadow value of q are locked to their respective
pre-shock steady state values.14 Under this restriction, (34)-(36) still describe the dynamic system
in the state space where there is investment (z > 0) and entry (n > 0). However, the intensity
of tunneling 1    is no longer constant; it now depends on the prot rate , as detailed in (19),
and thus on x and z. Because of this dependence, the dynamic system can no longer be reduced
to a single di¤erential equation in x as in Proposition 4. Instead, we solve numerically the three
di¤erential equations (34)-(36) without any further transformation. For an arbitrary initial value
of x(t) we nd the value of z(t)15 that solves (34). Then (35) delivers the entry rate n(t). Finally,
x(t+ 1) is obtained through (36).
The solid lines of Figure 12 represent the experiment of reducing the intensity of empire building,

, from the baseline value of 0:1% to 0. In these simulations, changes in rmsprot rate  feed
back on the net return on active shareholdersmonitoring. In addition to the behavior of the
investment rate, of the entry rate and of rmssize, the gure also plots the adjustment of rms
equity shares among managers, active and minority shareholders. In the immediate aftermath of the
shock, rmsprotability increases and so do monitoring costs, for a given size of the rm. In the
previous section, we observed that when monitoring becomes more costly, minority shareholders try
to deter managerstunneling by allocating them a greater equity share. At the same time, because
it is anticipated that active shareholders will opt for a lower monitoring e¤ort, it is optimal to
reduce their equity share in the rm. The two top right plots display these adjustments with a up
and a downward jump of managersand active shareholdersequity shares, respectively. Overall,
minority shareholders retain a smaller equity share, which explains the worsening of the tunneling
e¤ect.
In the long run, the reduction in the empire building friction induces the economy to adjust
14 In experiments available upon request we observed that even when C=Y is allowed to adjust endogenously, its
variation generates negligible e¤ects on the impulse responses of z, n and x.
15We set up a search on a grid of size 10 7.
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towards a smaller size of rms. During the transition, the prot rate declines, implying a gradual
reduction in the marginal monitoring cost. Hence, during the transition the equity shares are read-
justed in the opposite direction relative to the adjustment observed in the immediate aftermath
of the shock. As a result, the intensity of tunneling progressively becomes less severe as the econ-
omy converges to its long-run equilibrium, further promoting the entry of new rms and reducing
rmssize. Thus, a mutually reinforcing interaction (multiplier e¤ect) arises between the degree of
consolidation of the market structure and the intensity of corporate governance frictions.
To emphasize the qualitative di¤erences between the current specication of the monitoring
technology and the specication of the previous section, the gure plots in dashed lines the impulse
responses when the feedback from rmsprot rate to the cost of monitoring is muted. Specically,
along the dynamics we set the marginal cost of monitoring equal to the value observed in the pre-
shock steady state. Clearly, there is no readjustment of the equity shares in this case. The downward
adjustment of the rms size and of the entry rate are somewhat faster when the feedback e¤ect is
present, because during the transition active shareholdersmonitoring becomes more e¢ cient and
managerstunneling becomes less severe. This gives an extra kick to the rms downsizing relative
to what would be observed in the absence of the feedback e¤ect.
9 Long run
In the previous two sections, we investigated the e¤ects of shocks to corporate governance frictions
in the region where both entry and investment take place (n > 0 and z > 0). In this section,
we study the e¤ect of the frictions on the long-run pattern of development of the economy. As
demonstrated in Section 6, the economy can go through three subsequent stages of development: a
rst stage with no entry and no investment, a second stage with only entry, and a third stage with
both investment and entry.
9.1 Empire building
Figure 13 compares the long-run evolution of two economies that di¤er only in the intensity of the
empire building friction. We use the same parameters of Table 1 for the low-friction economy (solid
lines). The intensity of empire building (
) is ten times higher in the alternative, high-friction
economy (dashed lines). Both economies start from the same initial rm size x0. At rst, they
simply produce the nal good using an exogenously given variety of intermediate goods: there is
no entry and no investment. Specically, (24) and (25) hold as inequalities because both the return
to entry and the return to investment are too low relative to the discount rate. The whole net
output is consumed and there is no saving. In this phase, therefore, the only source of dynamics
is the enlargement of the population that causes a gradual increase of rmssize x and thereby of
rmsprotability. As the (quality-adjusted) prot rate rises, at a certain point rm entry becomes
protable. The trigger point is reached rst in the low-friction economy, where prots tend to be
higher, for a given rm size x (which is the same in the two economies during the rst phase of
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development).16 Afterwards, the paths of development of the two economies are no longer the
same. The delay in turning on entry in the high-friction economy results in relatively larger rms.
Indeed, from that time onwards the two economies systematically di¤er in the market structure.
The high-friction economy will have larger rms, and fewer of them, and will use a smaller variety
of intermediate goods to produce the nal consumption good.
In the second phase of development, incumbent rms do not yet invest because it is not protable
to do so  formally, the right-hand-side of equation (24) is smaller that the right-hand-side of
equation (25). Because the rms that populate the low-friction economy are of smaller size, their
rate of return on investment is systematically lower than in the high-friction economy. Consequently,
the low-friction economy enters the investment phase of development (third phase) later than the
high-friction economy, and has a relatively lower investment rate even when investment is protable
in both economies. In brief, the low-friction economy grows at a faster pace in the second phase of
development, but in the third phase it is outpaced in terms of growth by the high-friction economy,
in which incumbent rms invest more aggressively.
9.2 Tunneling
We next compare the transition paths of two economies characterized by a di¤erent monitoring
e¢ ciency M . In Figure 14 the solid lines represent the same baseline economy as in Figure 13.
In the alternative, low-friction economy (dashed-lines) the monitoring technology is more e¢ cient.
As noted earlier, in the economy where active shareholders are more e¢ cient monitors, managers
tunneling is less intense. The key variable that explains the di¤erent transitional experiences of
the high- and the low-friction economy is the size  of the rmsprots that remains in the hands
of minority shareholders. Because this is greater in the low-friction economy, entry occurs earlier
and thereafter is systematically more intense. As a result, rms size is always smaller, which
explains the relatively less aggressive investment of incumbent rms. Despite these di¤erences in
the market structure, our calculations suggest that the two economies enjoy about the same level
of welfare, evaluated from the initial viewpoint: the low-friction economy benets relatively more
on the variety dimension, whereas the high-friction economy reaps relatively more benets from
the faster pace at which incumbents invest in their intermediate products. During the transition
neither economy systematically outperforms the other with respect to the per capita output growth
rate.
10 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the impact of nancial market imperfections, in the form of corporate
governance frictions, on growth and industry dynamics. Following prior literature, we have posited
16The baseline parameters generate a sequence of development in which entry precedes investment by incumbents.
In principle, under an alternative parametrization, the model allows for an inverted sequencing in which incumbents
investment kicks in rst.
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two forms of frictions: an empire building issue, such that managers enjoy private benets from
expanding rmssize, and a tunneling issue, such that managers can divert resources from rms. We
have also posited that, while rm active shareholders can monitor and mitigate managerstunneling
activities, they cannot commit to monitoring managers. The design of monitoring incentives for
active shareholders allows them to extract rents from minority shareholders. The analysis reveals
that both corporate governance frictions tend to increase the concentration of the market structure
and depress the entry rate of new rms. By contrast, the frictions have contrasting e¤ects on
the investment of incumbent rms and in the long run tend to make incumbents invest more
aggressively.
When the economy is hit by a shock to the intensity of the tunneling or of the empire building
friction, the mechanisms described above contrast each other in shaping the welfare impact of
the shock. For example, following a reduction in the intensity of tunneling, the positive welfare
e¤ects associated with the acceleration in rmsentry can be dumped down by the slower rate of
investment of incumbents. When the friction corrected is instead managersempire building, it is
more likely that the positive welfare e¤ects prevail. Importantly, the analysis predicts that policy
reforms that enhance corporate governance benet economies with poor corporate governance more
than economies with good governance.
The analysis leaves interesting questions open for future research. The paper does not make
explicit the conditions on the supply side of the nancial market that could exacerbate or alleviate
corporate governance frictions. However, it is often argued that lax credit policies of nancial
institutions have allowed large businesses to pursue empire building objectives. Furthermore, such
policies, and the resulting rm leverage build up, have allegedly inuenced managersability to
divert resources from rms. Thus, explicitly accounting for the role of nancial institutions as
creditors could yield important insights into the relation between corporate governance and growth.
We leave this and other issues for future research.
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Table 1: Baseline Economy, Steady State
Panel A: Parameters
Production and Entry Households Corporate Governance
       M S M S 

0.167 0.25 0.768 0.567 2.2 0.03 0.0121 0.07 1.068 0.0001 0.7975 0.001
Panel B: Steady State
Ratio Percentages
x z n y r s ea em 1  ea   em  cS(S) cM (M)
P
27.91 1.60 1.61 2 5 10.51 5:35 18:43 76:23 76.07 7:37 0:27 0:20
Table 2: Reduction of Empire Building Friction
 Steady State (%)  Welfare (%)
x z, y, r s Trans LR Tot
Baseline -0.28 -0.04 -0.04 0.39 -0.51 -0.12
50% higher 
 -0.28 -0.04 -0.03 0.40 -0.51 -0.11
high 
 -0.55 -0.08 0.03 0.80 -0.76 0.04
50% higher  -0.61 -0.13 0.05 0.82 -0.88 -0.06
high  -1.57 -0.64 0.10 1.81 -1.84 -0.03
Note: The value of 
 drops by 0.001 in all ve scenarios. In the second and third row from the top, the
initial value of 
 is 50% higher and 50 times higher than the baseline value of Table 1, respectively. In the
following two rows, the entry cost  is 50% and twice higher than the baseline value. Only variables listed
in Table 1 that displayed some change are reported here. The last three columns summarize the transitional
(Trans), long- run (LR) and total (Tot) welfare e¤ects of the shock (see text or note of Figure 10).
Table 3: Improvement of Monitoring Technology
 Steady State (%)  Welfare (%)
x z, y, r s ea em 1-ea-em  cS(.) cM (.)
P
Trans LR Tot
Baseline -0.32 -0.05 -0.04 0.21 -0.75 0.54 0.38 0.80 0.03 0.21 0.53 -0.58 -0.05
lower M -0.31 -0.04 -0.03 0.20 -0.72 0.52 0.36 0.77 0.03 0.21 0.51 -0.56 -0.05
low M -0.29 0.04 -0.03 0.19 -0.68 0.49 0.34 0.73 0.02 0.20 0.48 -0.53 -0.05
higher  -0.71 -0.15 0.02 0.21 -0.75 0.54 0.38 0.80 0.03 0.21 0.98 -1.01 -0.03
high  -1.80 -0.73 0.07 0.21 -0.75 0.54 0.38 0.80 0.03 0.21 2.09 -2.11 -0.02
Note: The value of M increases by 3% in all ve scenarios. In the second and third row from the top,
the pre-shock value of M is respectively 98% and 95% of the baseline value. In the forth and fth row,
the entry cost  is 50% and 100% higher than the baseline value. The last three columns summarize the
transitional (Trans), long- run (LR) and total (Tot) welfare e¤ects of the shock.
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Figure 1: Investor Protection and Firm Entry
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Figure 2: Steady-State E¤ect of an Increase in Tunneling
.
32
Figure 3: Steady-State E¤ect of an Increase in Empire Building
.
Figure 4: Equilibrium Dynamics
.
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses to Empire Building Shock
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Note: The rates are in percentage. The parameter 
 is lowered from 0:001 to 0. Underlying parameters
are shown in Table 1, Panel A. For steady state values before the shock see Table 1, Panel B.
Figure 6: Empire Building Comparing Impulse Responses
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Note: The rates are in percentage. Deviations of x from its pre-shock steady state are also in percentage.
The solid lines represent the impulse responses (in di¤erences with respect to the pre-shock level) of the
same experiment depicted in Figure 5. The dashed lines and dotted lines show similar experiments with a
50% higher initial level of  and of 
, respectively.
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Figure 7: Empire Building Comparing Impulse Responses (cont.)
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Note: The solid lines are the impulse responses of the baseline 
 experiment (in di¤erences with respect
to the pre-shock level). The dotted lines represent a similar experiment in an economy in which the initial
value of 
 equals 0:05. The dashed lines are the impulse responses of an economy where the entry cost, ,
is double relative to the baseline economy.
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Figure 8: Impulse Responses to Tunnelling (Monitoring) Shock
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Note: The rates are in percentage. The parameter M governing the e¢ ciency of active shareholders
monitoring is raised by 3% from its baseline value of Table 1, Panel A. For steady state values before the
shock see Table 1, Panel B.
Figure 9: Tunnelling Comparing Impulse Responses
0 10 20 30 40
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
x 10 -3 Investment Rate (z)
0 10 20 30 40
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
Entry Rate (n)
0 10 20 30 40
-3
-2
-1
0
1
x 10 -3 Ouput Growth Rate (y)
0 10 20 30 40
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
Firm's Size (x)
0 10 20 30 40
-3
-2
-1
0
x 10 -3 Return on Assets (r)
Time (years)
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Saving Rate (s)
Time (years)
Lower mM
Higher b
Note: The solid lines represent the impulse responses (in di¤erences with respect to the pre-shock level)
due to a 3% increase in the e¢ ciency of the monitoring technology (M ) relative to its baseline value (the
same baseline experiment is depicted in Figure 8). The dotted lines show a similar experiment when the
pre-shock e¢ ciency of the monitoring technology, M , is 98% of the baseline case. The dashed lines show a
similar experiment for an economy where the entry cost, , is 50% higher than the baseline.
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Figure 10: Welfare E¤ects and Decomposition
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Note: The top two graphs decompose the welfare e¤ects of a reduction of 
 by 0:001, starting from its
baseline value of 0:001 (left) and from a value of 0:05 (right). The bottom two graphs show a similar
decomposition associated with a rise of M by 3%, from its baseline value (left) and from 95% of its baseline
value (right). The solid line is the di¤erence between the discounted log of per capita consumption after the
arrival of the shock and what would have been attained with the pre-shock consumption growth rate. Its
integral is the total welfare e¤ect of the shock. The bottom plot is the di¤erence between the discounted log
of per capita consumption calculated with the post-shock consumption steady state growth rate and what
would have been attained with the pre-shock steady state growth rate. Its integral is the long-run welfare
e¤ect of the shock. The top line is the di¤erence between the two lines. It captures the transitional e¤ect
and any initial, level e¤ect. In last three columns of the top row of Tables 2 and 3, we report the overall
transitional, long-run, and total e¤ects as a percentage of the welfare U of the pre-shock steady state.
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Figure 11: Welfare Change Wide Range of Economies
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Note: The top three graphs (Panel A) plot the total welfare e¤ect of a reduction of 
 by 0:001, against
di¤erent initial values of 
; , and 1 . The variation in tunneling, 1 , is generated through variations
of M . The bottom three graphs (Panel B) plot the total welfare e¤ect when the e¢ ciency of the monitoring
technology, M , improves by 3%. The baseline parameters are in Table 1, Panel A. In all the graphs, the
welfare change on the vertical axis is in percentage.
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Figure 12: Empire Building Shock with Feedback E¤ect
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The solid lines represent the impulse responses to a reduction of 
 from 0:001 to 0. The cost of monitoring
is c(M) = (M + (x))M . The value of M = 0:001 as in Table (1) while  = 0:05. To maintain the
baseline target of income growth rate of 2% and of stealing of 0.2%, some of the parameter values in Table (1)
are altered. In particular, S is normalized to 1, M = 0:15, S = 0:77 and  = 0:61: To gain intuition on
how rmssize interacts with the corporate governance frictions, the dashed lines plot the impulse responses
under the constraint that the variable component of the monitoring cost is kept constant to the pre-shock
level, that is (x) = , where  is the pre-shock steady state value of the prot rate .
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Figure 13: Empire Building and Phases of Development
0 200 400 600 800
0
0.5
1
Investment Rate (z)
0 200 400 600 800
0
0.5
1
1.5
Entry Rate (n)
0 200 400 600 800
0
0.5
1
1.5
Ouput Growth Rate (y)
0 200 400 600 800
20
22
24
26
28
Firm's Size (x)
0 200 400 600 800
1
2
3
4
5
Return on Assets (r)
Time (years)
0 200 400 600 800
-5
0
5
10
Saving Rate (s)
Time (years)
Higher W
Note: The solid lines represent the dynamics of an economy characterized by the parameters values in
Table 1, Panel A. The dashed lines refer instead to an economy with an intensity of the empire-building
friction, 
, ten times higher than the baseline economy. The two economies have the same initial condition
on x.
Figure 14: Tunnelling and Phases of Development
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Note: The solid lines represent the dynamics of an economy characterized by the parameter values in Table
1, Panel A. The dashed lines refer instead to an economy with a 20% better monitoring e¢ ciency M . The
two economies have the same initial condition on x.
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